Victimological Jurisprudence Introduction

Richard Twinney, a victimologist, believes that our perception of who is a victim is shaped by personal and social values. He argues that the concept of a victim is a social construction, and it determines how we characterize victims of crime. The identification of a victim is crucial in defining an act as criminal. However, the field of victimology focuses not only on victims of crime but also on victims of abuse. Twinney suggests that our understanding of victimization should extend beyond crime and consider victims of police force, war, the correctional system, and state violence. This broader perspective challenges our theories of reality and highlights the moral implications of victimization. Hello learners, now we shall have a basic idea of what Richard Twinney, an eminent victimologist said about who he would consider to be a victim. He had said that personal and social values shape our conception of the victim. And he also said that the argument he was making throughout his paper is that the victim in quote and unquote is a social construction. This wisdom allows us to characterize the victims of crime. Moreover, it defines us who is actually the victim in any given situation. What this also means is that alternative victims can also be constituted. Now why we conceive of some persons as victims and others not as victims is a consequence of our common sense assumptions. Acts in fact are defined as criminal because something or someone is conceived to be a victim. In this sense the victim that is a conception of the victim precedes the definition of an act as criminal. So if a victim cannot be imagined, a criminal law is neither created nor enforced. A victimless crime can only be one that is defined after the fact by an outside observer. This simply means that you know even for criminal law the identification of a victim is so important. However, the victimological jurisprudence stems from this fact that victims were never a part of the criminal justice administration system. So that's why Richard Finney goes on to argue that the victim's refusal to report is in part a reflection of how they conceive of themselves as victims. While many felt the police would do nothing if the offences were reported, the most frequent reason offered for failure to report an offence was that it represented a private matter or that the victim did not want to harm the offender. Now there are definite public conceptions of victims and victimization. These conceptions are likely patterned and vary from one segment of the society to another. But most important to the formulation of public policy are those conceptions held by the ruling segments of society. Now these are the conceptions that ultimately regulate our lives and would certainly revise or at least expand our image of victimization. And this is the beauty of Richard Finney's argument on the victimological jurisprudence. He says that breaking out of the theory of reality that has dominated criminological thought, we would begin to conceive of the victims of police force, the victims of war, the victims of the correctional system, the victims of state violence, the victims of oppression of any sort. Which means, in a deeper sense, what is at stake in any discussion of victimization is one's morality. Neither law nor legal discussions can be devoid of morality. To eliminate morality from the law is to eliminate all laws as we know. To conceive of the person who is assaulted as a victim is to hold a view of proper social conduct. Perhaps it is time that we investigate our own minds, our own theories of reality. So this in totality means that victimization is not only to do with crime but could be for very many other reasons. And that is why the victimological jurisprudence is just not about victims of crime but also victims of abuse.