Episode 44 - NR Andrew Little SP Noise reduction ###

Elizabeth is in Washington, D.C. for Thanksgiving. She had a typical American day, starting with a bagel for breakfast, watching the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, and enjoying a Thanksgiving dinner with friends. She also brought some New Zealand treats to share. The guest on the podcast is Andrew Little, former Leader of the Opposition and Minister from the Labour Cabinet in New Zealand. He reflects on the recent U.S. election and believes that Trump's victory was due to disaffection, concerns about the southern border, and doubts about Biden's ability to handle the job. He also mentions the shift in Democratic support to Trump and the volatility of American politics. Welcome to the latest episode of What's the Story, Old Glory, where we ask people what on earth is going on in that phenomenal country that we both love. And Elizabeth, you are over there. Welcome, Elizabeth. Where are you today? Yeah. Hi. Glad to be here. I am on Capitol Hill, working over here for a couple of weeks. It's really great to be here. It's Thanksgiving evening here on the Thursday, the 28th of November. So I've lived an American day today. I got up and I had a bagel for breakfast. It was cream cheese. And then I went for a walk. Went to see the Naval Yard. In South Washington, where I'm staying, and then I watched the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade on TV. And then I went down to a friend's house for Thanksgiving dinner. And I'm now full of turkey and pumpkin pie and mashed potatoes. And it's been a wonderfully American day. Oh, that's fantastic. And the fact that you could turn up to our podcast on a Thanksgiving evening, I think that's awesome. I'm not sure I would have had the capacity to do that. I'm going to admit that. Yeah. Well, at least you've obviously restrained yourself across perhaps alcoholic beverages. So well done. A couple of Samuel Adams. A couple of Samuel Adams. What a perfect... That is the total American experience, isn't it? For our listeners in New Zealand, that's some of the most original American beer. It's probably only 2%, or it might be mean. It's pretty flavorful for an American lager, I will say, Samuel Adams Boston Lager. There's a lot more flavor than Budweiser, or Pabst-Dorst-Clause, or anything like that. Which of course, a good beer is, just in case anyone's thinking that we were in any way critiquing their quality of experience. But it's not... I did take with me to the Thanksgiving dinner an array of New Zealand finest. So I took some Whittaker's Chocolates, some Marlborough White Wine, and some Scotts Beer from Oamaru. So the Americans really enjoyed these in a lager, and Pilsner, so just a shout out to Scotts Brewery in Oamaru. And also some New Zealand Whiskey Marmalade by the New Zealand Whiskey Collection, also in Oamaru. So there we go. Doing some sponsorship without even getting any money from them. Oh well, early days. This could well be a marmalade sponsored podcast in due course. Oamaru to the world. So our guest today, exciting, sort of the second part of a two-part series where we reflect on the results from perhaps a New Zealand perspective. Who have we got today? Yeah, so today we're very lucky to have former Leader of the Opposition and Minister from the Labour Cabinet in New Zealand, Andrew Little. Yes, and Andrew is going to reflect on the results from a centre-left perspective, which hopefully you'll enjoy. Just give us a brief outline for our listeners because not all of them will know who you are, of course our New Zealand listeners will, but a little bit of background of your career and in particular how America has crossed your paths over no doubt many years. Sure, so I'm a lawyer by training and I spent the first nearly 20 years of my legal career working for a trade union, the largest private sector union, and half of that time has been as National Secretary or in the US terms of being equivalent of the President of the union that I've been running it. The nature of our union meant that we had a number of American-owned companies in particular International Paper and a number of countries of that sort. So I ended up dealing with some of that when the American directors or senior managers came out, would deal with them. I glassed with everyone. I then went to prospects in New Zealand in Parliament and was an opposition, was Leader of the Opposition for a period and that required me to engage with overseas counterparts as well. So I had a visit to the US in 2015, met a number of representatives in both the House and the Senate. But then our party became government so I was a Minister. My portfolio responsibilities included the Security and Intelligence Agency, Minister of Justice. So I engaged with counterparts there, particularly Bill Barr, the Attorney General, and various heads of national security organisations. I should add too, with the union I got a State Department visit to watch the tidings of the 2008 election when Barack Obama was elected as President. Before then I'd been to an ASL CIO Congress in Chicago, which was fascinating, which is the first time I saw Barack Obama speaking. But when Barack Obama, it was people like Ted Kennedy and Jackie Jackson, amazing orators speaking. So you see that guy and you can't help but be fascinated in US politics. So yes, I've always maintained a close relationship. And of course the other thing is the US is so important to the rest of the world, the politics of the rest of the world in the sense of peace and stability to the extent that we have it. It's sort of, you know, obviously somewhat well-found at the moment. But the US plays an absolutely vital role and is a long-standing partner of the US-New Zealand. We need to maintain a positive relationship. We have to be able to disagree, as we have done in the past. But we have to maintain a substantive relationship and I strongly believe in that. What does he think of the election that we've just had? I assume that you watched it closely. What do you think, what's your opinion as to why it turned out the way it did, why Trump managed to sweep it in such extraordinary fashion in a way that people were not predicting? I was always a bit sceptical about the coverage we get from New Zealand. One thing I've learned when you go to the US is that the impression you get when you go across the media is a different impression than you get from here. So I was somewhat sceptical about what we were being told. And I think what it boils down to, and knowing people there, including people who were supporting Trump, there was clearly a huge disaffection because of the impact of inflation, the cost of living had gone up, people were struggling. I think there was a deep resentment about the failure to deal with the southern border and the mass movement of illegal immigrants that tend to be used. Obviously that was played up for political purposes, but the reality is it played on people. And I think there was a sense also that Joe Biden was elderly, was probably not able to do the full rigour of the job, and a sense that that was concealed from people until he had his back-to-back with Donald Trump and it was revealed. I think people just felt a little bit like overstated that they felt that there was an attempt to hide something. But there was a big turn of events for the activity about Trump, regardless of the level of responsibility he shared or takes for what happened on the 6th of January 2021. There were sort of multiple prosecutions and those sorts of things. I have spoken to people who felt sympathy for him because they thought that he was being hounded. So I think the combination of those things, the fact that Kamala Harris never really found a strong, coherent narrative about what she was offering and how different she would be from Biden, I think handed it to Trump. When you look at American politics, it's always sort of been quite tribal and in some ways a bit predictable about who would support a Republican. Certainly if we went back sort of 20 years ago, Andrew, you and I could quickly paint a caricature of a Republican candidate and a Republican supporter, sort of country club Republican, and we could certainly paint a similar opposing or different view of a regular Democratic supporter. You know, blue collar, perhaps less formally educated. How is it that over a relatively short period of time, huge tranches of historically strong Democratic support has flipped to Trump? And do you see this as something that is just a one-off or perhaps talks to something deeper in terms of what's going on in the sort of right versus left paradigm in that country? I think it remains to be seen as a specific thing. It happens in favour of Trump and Republicans, whether that is enduring. I think, you know, given the times in which the solution took place and their real sense of pressure on Households, and I think the real sense of they wanted somebody who they thought was best qualified to fix the problems is, you know, is on average so short, which was the economy and it was what was happening with illegal immigration. Trump was having a massive profile, not just from his previous presidency, but even before that through his television appearances, his, you know, naked self-promotion in New York since the 1980s. So he had that profile, and he was a businessman, a successful businessman, and that's what people were looking for. They didn't trust who the Democrats had put up, whether in Carmela, whether Tim Ross, whether anybody else. They thought Trump was the person because of his background and what he was able to do, and I think because of his complete shamelessness about who he is, and even though people think logically that he's done some things wrong, they thought that the force of personality was what was needed to fix some intractable problems, and that's what they're looking for. And whether that, in a sense, whether the shift that happened in 2024 continues in two years' time or four years' time, I think that remains to be seen. I think the way they did after American politics, as we know, is that there is a level of volatility. I mean, you look after Biden's success in 2020, then you look at the midterms of 2022, there was a shift. Whereas the Republicans in 2020 had secured the House, there was a shift away from them in 2022. So there is a sustainable level of shift in their politics in the reasonably short span cycle in Congressional elections. Coming to it from your trade union background, I was actually out walking around D.C. on Saturday, and I found a campaign button sitting on the lawn at their lips for the National Transport Union, and it was a Harris-Wolfe pin. But it was quite surprising, this election, the union bosses that either wouldn't endorse a candidate or, in fact, endorsed Trump. But then we saw the popular vote go in Trump's way. So do those sorts of high-level endorsements from those types of organisations, are they even meaningful anymore? Yeah, I mean, there's another question about that, too. Like the celebrity endorsements, you know, Kamala Harris said, you know, Taylor Swift and Bruce Springsteen and all those things. But the popular vote. I've been with unions, too. I think, you know, even American unions are conscious that they have to reflect the mood of their membership. And, you know, American unions, the big surviving American unions that tend to, you know, machinists that transfer into public sector unions, they are conscious of that, and I think particularly public sector unions like Tencent and the machinists, they couldn't bring themselves to endorse Kamala Harris. Things are probably amongst their membership. People instinctively, just for the sake of a better deal for them, want a Trump. And, but for other reasons, they go into the union leadership and they naturally want to give the endorsement. I think the mere fact that some unions that ordinarily would have endorsed Democratic candidates were nominated didn't endorse anybody was telling enough that there was a shift in the mood of union members. Andrew, you talk about volatility in the US system, and, you know, if we were betting, we would put money on a flip back to the Democrats of either the House or the Senate in two years' time, reflecting that volatility. But sort of helicoptering out a little bit, do you think that it talks to a wider challenge for centre-right and centre-left parties, not only in America, but also elsewhere, where there is growing impatience at the political institutions about to deliver for me, my family and our respective ambition, and both sides are getting hammered, really, electorally, if they don't turn it around quickly? And what do you think that means for the traditional centre-right, centre-left parties, which have sort of largely governed from the centre for a number of decades now, and obviously we're seeing the rise of populism, which puts that at risk? Yeah, I think that is a risk. The idea that, well, I think, first of all, I think expectations have changed a lot. People do expect, funnily enough, more government. There's a sort of contradictory thought. We want more government intervention on the things that support me and my family, but we don't want the government to get too big and powerful and interfere too much. And that's the debate that we're about to have now with this state-of-the-art report on the review of the COVID response. I think the challenge for government is conditions are changing, particularly for eastern governments. Conditions are changing, population profile is changing, there's an ageing population, more demand for more spending to support the needs of an ageing population, so more healthcare spending across all the areas of health, particularly aides to residential care. We want good public services, we want good education, we want the fire service to be there when we need them, we want the police to be there and maintain law and order. And those things are under real pressure. Government revenues in real terms are either tapering or falling, but with greater demand on government to deliver on supporting good public services. And of course, the income transfers that are now such a huge chunk of government spending are posing real tensions for governments. So the idea of incremental change for long-term improvement is a way to attract it to more people. And as you see, income disparity is growing, and a growing chunk of people are so dependent on the support they get from the state through tax credits, through accommodation supplements, through those sorts of things. Because when it comes to accommodation, more people are in it. Their demands are increasingly greater, and it's getting harder and harder for government to deliver. So they don't deliver on everything, they don't meet expectations, and they get alienated. I'm not sure what the answer to that is, because whatever discourse you try to have about, well, yep, we can do a lot of things, but there are going to be limits, and maybe we can make these changes and those changes, and maybe it'll take a long time. There's going to be equally powerful forces that will patch into the very strong sentiment, this is wrong, I'm losing, something has to change, and it doesn't matter what the change is, but we have to change what today is, and change the status quo. And that's a very powerful force to deal with during elections and in the political discourse that we have. Interesting Trump's sort of response to that conundrum, if you can put it that way, seems to be a, obviously bringing in a lot of people that are outside government, and b, sort of taking quite a, potentially, slash and burn approach to federal agencies and the sorts of things that the federal government does. What are your thoughts on his approach in that respect, with the likes of Elon Musk being brought into senior advisory positions, and other cabinet members as well, in terms of what his policy approaches are going to be? Yeah, I think it's going to be very challenging for them. I mean, the US federal government, regardless of who's been in power, has this massive structural deficit now, to trillions of dollars, and Trump has made that a thing, Elon Musk says he can trim $2 or $3 trillion out of their budget. But that is going to have an impact. It's going to, people will, if and when that happens, people will feel it. So, and Trump knows, I think he knows, at least the Treasury Secretary, Deputy, and others will know that they will have to find a substitute somebody for their revenue. Tariffs will go some way, but of course tariffs will have an impact. And so, I mean, he's announced where he wants to go on day one, with tariffs on China, Canada and Mexico. But that's going to have an inflationary effect. That will push up the cost of goods in the US, the very thing that the majority of people in the US elected Trump to fix. So, they are going to face this contradiction, I think. People are starting to say prices are continuing to rise disproportionately, and a loss of public services, because Elon Musk and Feedback Romney are going to cut the pendant. We're going to have to wait and see how that plays out. I mean, that will have implications, obviously, for the rest of us, because it will have an impact on the value of the US dollar. It already is. But tariffs will affect what we're able to generate and then come from exports to the US. We will sit on the sidelines and watch, but we're going to have to expect that it's going to affect us. So, he's put some unusual people around him, in my view. And I noted in your intro, you talked about a good working relationship that you had with William Barr, Trump's first, or last, Attorney General, at the end of his first term. And, no, the two of you, I'm sure, differed on politics, but my sense is that you would have found him a smart, intelligent, respectable American statesman, and you would have found areas to agree on. When you look at the picks that he's put around him now, what do you think? It feels to me that it's quite a departure from Trump 1, where the Republican establishment at least tried to ring sense him a bit with people who had some experience and was a little bit more traditional. What do you think of the people around him now, and what do you think that bodes for us all? Yeah, it's pretty clear that an overriding criterion was loyalty to Trump, and he's got that in pretty much all of them. I think there's a thing about who best represents the MAGA brand, the Making America Great Again brand, which most of them do. I think, I don't know, maybe four years ago, I wouldn't have said this, and maybe nobody would, but I think one of the best picks is Michael Rubio for Secretary of State, I think he's a conventional Republican politician. I think he's got some pretty hard-line views on the likes of China and Venezuela and things like that. But in every other respect, he's a pretty conventional and orthodox conservative politician who you'd expect a Republican administration would have. Pretty much after that, it's difficult to see what might constitute an orthodox appointment and traditional conservative values. I think the Treasury Secretary will be interesting. Scott Fitzgibbon. Kevin Fackbery. I mean, he's a person with a second stance and doesn't have a standard sort of MAGA Donald Trump profile. But we're trying to see what he does. I think the others are pretty much loyal to Trump, loyal to the MAGA brand, and whereas our form of government depends on the public service being a point of continuity, there's no question that most of these appointments are about discontinuity, about not feeling any need to adhere to or provide continuity from, not just the Biden administration, but from US federal government per se. They want you to do something different and be different. And they appear to not be fearful of a radical shakup. I mean, most of them are brilliant idiots. Most of them are brilliant idiots. And so there's a sense that, to some degree, it doesn't matter what they do, because they'll have to suffer the economic consequences of it. Their wealth will get them through. They'll never feel uncomfortable. On the other hand, their wealth might change a bit. But these are not people who will ever have to go back to a life of selling their time, their labour, doing whatever. They are very wealthy people who are inflated from, most likely will be inflated from the impact of a lot of their decisions. Given your ministerial background to do with security as well, what are your thoughts around where things are heading in that direction with Trump back in charge now? Yeah, I think that is going to be, I think, for want of a better term, the most interesting area. Because we are, you know, the world is in probably the most volatile state it's been for 30 or 40 years. With the conflict still going on between Russia and Ukraine, the rising economic and military power of China, and China reasserting itself, and sort of destabilizing influences in Southeast Asia generally. And in the Middle East, of course, incredibly volatile. We are not seeing peace agreements and stuff between Israel and Lebanon at the moment. But Israel has really asserted itself in a way that it never has before, beyond its own borders, not to mention within its own borders. The US typically has its own borders as well. It's so far supporting Ukraine. I think there's clearly a reluctance on the part of the Trump administration to continue the type of support that Ukraine has got. The question will be, even if America winds down, even with all the support for Ukraine, whether Europe will step up and continue to support it. I mean, Europe's still more at stake. If Russia gets away with the territorial grab that it's clearly trying to make, that it's incursion into Ukraine. I think we saw with the first Trump administration the sort of rewriting of the rules of alliances and partnerships and friendships. I mean, Trump seems to do worse for the countries that were close to the US than those that were first apart. Trump is not being beholden to old-fashioned rule of hands to others. You know, he demands it of us. But he doesn't see the US as a lost terrorist of the world. His America First policy, which is now sort of quite entrenched through the think tank, you know, the America First Policy Institute, he's going to prosecute it as a more isolationist policy. We just have to expect that. And the question will be whether the rest of the world can step up and deal with those who pay tribute to our kind of view of law and peaceful world order, or whether we're going to have to tolerate from the despots and tyrants. So we're competing with our basic principles and values. That's going to be the challenge. I think China may be able to see an opportunity in relation to Taiwan. And you emphasize that it's not going to at least put on a show of some sort of strength of support for Taiwan and just kind of stand back. And that will have implications for the rest of Southeast Asia. But, you know, it's just, I recall in 2016 and 2013, we all said, OK, we didn't want the guy elected. It'll all be different when he's in office. You know, the solemnity and gravity of office will change. And of course, that wasn't the case. So I think we are justified to expect worse than we might otherwise have done. But it's still hard to predict what that might look like, given where this ends. Yeah, I mean, this is his last throw of the dice, right? He's not going to get another shot. So his lame duck and the absence of the word that they're talking about, Biden, over here at the moment, being a lame duck. Yeah. I mean, of course, he does try to pull some sort of attention to the constitution and try and be another FDR. But that'll be a long shot. Yeah. And he'll be on the wrong side of 80s, I guess. Yeah. Oh, 80s, a new 60 over there. Don't you know this, Elizabeth? So, you know, when you're talking about his domestic politics before and his appointments, Andrew, I thought you raised a really good point around how he's driven by sort of wanting to shake the thing up, almost chaos theory, if you like. And if he has to break it to get his objectives through, then so be it. But when that then gets applied to a geopolitical context, I guess that's what makes people really nervous, because, you know, we have not had such a force of wanting to destabilize and at worst, you know, bring down elements of the Western alliance and move around for the end of 100 years. Right. Where do you see him? You know, where would he apply chaos theory to geopolitics? What does that look like? And what are you concerned about when you look out from a New Zealand perspective to what that could look like? I think there's two areas of concern. One is Europe, because he clearly has scapegoats for Europe. And Europe is under a real test at the moment. Certainly with Germany in the state that it's in, it's one of the two big countries in Europe that we expect to be reasonably stable, certain, and off the streets. And Germany isn't disarray. France is, Macron is probably the exception in French politics in terms of his outreach and all the rest, but he can't deliver it significantly. The UK now is sort of at arm's length from Europe to try to influence it, and I think will try to be all but a member of the EU, but still a long way to go. So I think, and Europe I think realizes that they now face a major test, particularly with how they respond to the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, that the US isn't there with the level of support they've had up to now. So I think that will be, that is an area to look at. And if Europe is allowed to become unstable, or more unstable than it is now, I think that will work well for anybody. I think the other area is, of course, China, and Trump has made his views about China, or his wish to compete with, and therefore suppress China's economic strength, if not the military strength, are pretty clear cuts. I certainly have, there are two views about China. The war needs China, the war needs China's economic power, its international power, and technological grunt that it brings to solve some of the major problems we have. But the other aspect is, we have to accept that they do have a growing military strength, they want to exercise that strength, a combination of their military and economic strength, and some of that poses a national security risk to ourselves and others. And the worry is that Trump does the wrong thing, sort of, on the economic front, that encourages or triggers China to do something on the military front, that creates greater instability, not just in our region, but around the world. I think that's going to be the equation that the Trump administration, and the fullness of that administration, that's all the people around Trump, have to moderate as more impetuous instincts to prevent harm happening to the rest of the world. So if I could just have a quick follow up. Biden, as we would expect, went back to a more multilateral approach, progressed the thinking around AUKUS, which to our listeners is the Australian, United States and the United Kingdom, more formal military alliance. You'll have the better language in that, I'm sure, Andrew, than I do. And they're potentially pillars of that alliance. Do you see that being a big part of Trump's approach with China, which certainly Biden's man in Asia Pacific, Kurt Campbell, was arguing for, a continuation of the Biden approach, if you like? Or will he play it as he seems to have always done, as a sort of, you know, we're at a poker at a Las Vegas joint, and I'm just going to deal with China myself, and I'll take it to the brink, and then might cut a deal on geopolitical solution that might work for China. But if I get a trade deal, which will work for me, which would put Taiwan under huge pressure, I would have thought. I guess the core of my question is, do you see the multilateral model surviving under Trump? And what could that mean for us? I think, I mean, Trump's view is not America first, but America alone, in my view. He doesn't respect multilateral or even bilateral arrangements, even with friendly countries. Yeah. I just don't think he gives much regard to it. And I think part of it is, he doesn't believe any other country can, or should be relied on, or can be relied on. It's just his worldview. So I don't think he can be particularly fast about what any other country thinks about what he does or might do. He clearly is supporting for conflict with China, even if it is only economic. And I think he doesn't think that an economic conflict might turn into a more security-based or military conflict. I just don't think he cares about that. I think, you know, he sees himself as the hero of whatever drama he's playing out at the time. And he will continue to do that in a certain prevalency. Will the multilateral institutions survive? Yes, they will. If they had to get through the next four or even a longer period without the U.S. and to the extent that this Trump administration may create a culture change within the federal bureaucracy of Washington, I think too many other countries have too much at stake to not to want to continue their multilateral relationships in the form of the government and the other bilateral relationships that they have. So it's kind of what I foresee is whatever Trump decides to do with American isolationism, the rest of the world will carry on, because it has to, working with each other. And for small countries like ours. And even our closest ally, Australia, even with their size. We can't do the things we need to do, have the security that we need to have, without the support of others. So if the U.S. isn't there, it will be. The U.K. We will have to forge a relationship with India and South Korea and some of our nearer Southeast Asian neighbors. And Japan. And they are all concerned about the security situation in this region. They will become, I think, close partners to us. So it could actually mean that we have new relationships and potentially better relationships with some other countries. And as you say, that multilateralism might survive in spite of Trump's best efforts. I guess he is often described as being transactional in nature. So if he can get something out of an immediate relationship, he will try to do that, I assume. Yeah, I think that's totally right. If there's something in it for him or for the U.S. on his behalf, yeah, sure, he'll be into it. But it'll be for that day or that period. He doesn't have a commitment to the more, what he might describe as ethereal values of liberal democracy and all the underpinning institutions that go with that, rule of law and independent tradition and all that stuff. It's just not what he thinks about or what he cares about. I don't think, I mean, I can't think of anything he's said that reflects his conception of Western values. He just doesn't think in those terms. But those things are important. And Western liberal values are important to us. And we have to protect them and maintain them. But we will do that. We'll continue to do that with others, with or without the U.S. Well, thank you so much, Andrew. That's been really interesting, your insights. Have you got anything else that you'd like to, got any other thoughts that you'd like to get off your chest before we wrap up? I think we are heading into a fascinating period historically for the world, obviously because of what is happening in the U.S. and the people who now report to bear on major international issues and conflicts. But also it's what the rest of the world is doing and then how we all choose to react as well. So I'm just trying to strap ourselves in. This is going to be one hell of a ride. It sure is. It's already been a hell of a ride thus far. I'm going to get more interested. Do you miss it? It's kind of nice being on the outside, you know, close to the periphery and observing with the knowledge and experience that we have. And there have been days when I'm glad to be out of it. But there are days equally where I'm keen to be back in the maelstrom, being part of the argument and what have you. So I think it's just about finding a way to participate and enjoy it. Well said. Look, Andrew, thank you very much. We've had a great conversation. I really appreciate you being so open with us. It's been a great pleasure, Matt. Talk to you later. Thanks. It was good to have, like you say, that was a centre-left perspective, sort of slightly contrasting to Tim Gross's centre-right perspective that we had in the last episode, which I'm sorry I couldn't join you for, but I was flying over the Pacific at the time. Yeah, I enjoyed that. I really enjoyed it. I mean, I have a huge amount of respect for Andrew as a person. Obviously, our politics domestically differed, but he's a thinker. He holds a view, which I like in politics, to not always necessarily follow the talking points that you would expect to be followed. So I liked his insight and particularly his, I guess, lesson for New Zealand or advice to New Zealanders, you know, we're just going to have to stay engaged with the world. America may well prove a challenge, but let's not get completely overwhelmed by it. The rest of the world are going to be in the same position as we are. In America, that's going to be very American first. It will have implications. It would be naive to think it's not. But, you know, we've got good people in government. We've got good people in officials. We've got good people in our businesses that export to the world. You know, let's back ourselves to navigate through it. Did you ever think you'd hear someone say that Marco Rubio is a very stable, predictable pick? Certainly not a former Labour cabinet minister and trade unionist. No, I wouldn't. But that's the world we live in now, isn't it? Right. You know, partly he's jumped the fence from being in the mud to be able to observe it from afar, or at least some distance. And so that does free you up to say what you really, really think. But as I said in the intro, I mean, Andrew's always been, I think, really good at holding a view. And, you know, I think that's a big part of politics, connecting with people either here or overseas. Yes. It's interesting thinking about, and I think we'll do a thing so soon on all of Trump's cabinet picks, but it's interesting that although he's picking some really out there people to be involved with his cabinet, he has picked a couple of his former campaign rivals from way back when we did the primaries earlier in the year. So Vivek Ramaswamy, like Andrew mentioned, is part of Trump's bureaucracy busting. Whatever. It's not really a department. It's called it Department of Government Efficiency. Doge or something. Or Doggy. I don't know. Let's go with Doge. And Doug Burgum is potentially going to be the Secretary for the Interior, which is quite interesting. So that's the Secretary for the Interior Department overseas, the Bureau of Reclamation and Water Related Issues. So that's why I'm here in America. So that's the biggest part of government that I get to do within my work. So that's quite interesting. Well, it's been a great chat. We look forward to our next episode where we will give you a little bit of taste of Elizabeth's experiences on the ground, where she can give us feedback from Americans and what they're thinking about Trump land four weeks, five weeks in. It's still sinking in, I think, for a lot of people over there, Elizabeth. Yeah, it is. But it's also surprisingly quiet. And, yeah, we can talk about that a bit more in a future episode. And keep an eye out, Elizabeth, keep an eye out on our YouTube channel because I'm putting together some videos, showing some people what it's like here in Washington, D.C. at the moment. Yeah. And so I'm just working my way through getting those episodes. So we'll get those up soon. But one thing that I did want to mention is yesterday something that was quite interesting to watch was the pardoning of the turkeys. Right. So Joe Biden did that. He started off quite well, as we saw him in the debate and that sort of thing. And then by the end of it, he was drifting off and wasn't really finishing sentences. So it's quite interesting. And shout out to a former colleague of mine who is now head of the Turkey Growers Union in America. So he was there on the White House lawn. And he actually had the job of looking after the turkeys in their hotel the night before they got pardoned. So hi, Dale, if you're listening. Yes. And hi, Joanna, if you're listening. I'm sure you are. And one of our super fans. Look, you just have this image, don't you, of in some ways wanting to be there. If you've had a bad track record, you sort of wouldn't have minded being close to the president this afternoon because in his drifting moments, he might have pardoned more people than just the turkey. And that could have been beneficial for you. It will be interesting to see who Trump pardons from day one, perhaps starting with himself. So until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Until we catch up again, this is Todd Muller from a beautiful and hot Tauranga. Thank you for watching.