85 Prinsep St 2 (online-audio-converter.com)

The speaker talks about their teaching schedule and their interest in visiting Singapore. They mention co-authors of a paper they have been working on and the feedback they received. The paper explores the relationship between tax avoidance and industry concentration. They discuss different perspectives and evidence on this topic, but it remains unclear whether tax avoidance leads to increased industry concentration. They also discuss the policy relevance of their research. A participant suggests toning down the policy implications in the paper. The speaker agrees and emphasizes that their paper provides evidence on the connection between tax avoidance and industry concentration. This is my teaching quarter, so I teach Mondays and Wednesdays, and I did recently look at what flying to Singapore would have been like, and I think if I left after teaching on Wednesday, I could make it there just in time to maybe get coffee for 30 minutes before having to hop back into the plane to come back for teaching on Monday. So, sorry I couldn't make it in person, but I appreciate this opportunity, and I hope I do get to meet you all there. As I was telling Dave before, I went to Singapore in 2019 and walked through the campus as I was going to the National Museum, and so it's a really beautiful campus and beautiful area. So, yeah, I hope to meet you all either there or at a conference in the near future. So, yeah, so this paper is co-authored with Christian, who is actually on the call. Hi, Christian. He's at NPU, and it's also co-authored with E.S. David Gates at Tilburg and Martin Jacobs at IESC. So, this paper has both been around for a while, and it's also brand new in a way. And so, David actually saw an early version of this paper. Was that two years ago, David? At Bergen? Yeah. So, we had our versions of the paper, and we got, again, and I'll get into the motivation in a second, but it had a similar motivation, but we were coming at the problem in a very different way. And so, based on the feedback that we got, we basically built this paper from the ground up again. And so, we just finished the new version last week. So, it's a nice thing about a workshop is the motivation and deadline. So, the timing is really great to get feedback on this paper. So, again, thanks for the opportunity. So, basically, what I'll do to kind of start off is give you sort of a high-level overview of the paper, and then we'll get into the results, and I'm sure you guys will have a lot of great ideas for us. But in terms of the jumping-off point, where we kind of started this observation, again, both the econ and finance literature, that energy concentration has decreased substantially in recent decades and more recently, you know. Now, the literature, econ and finance literature, both of them explore whether it's a good or bad thing and the requirements of this kind of literature. You are able to be critical of the facts there. So, what is the name of this paper? Basically, it seems to have the idea that factors are, it has the name of the material in it, and the material contributes to, say, the industry classification. To give you just a sense, again, it's important to understand that there's a recent policy material in the literature for this year, again, published here. And, again, there's a high distance to the actual technical analysis. I mean, the motivation for providing proper information and all the information possibly would be if you could control it, get out there and start providing the industry classification. So, you could do that. You could use the information for providing information about the tax claim. It's essential if there's no distortion of competition to be informed. Again, I am not going to go into taxes no more. I'm just going to touch on some of these formal fact-related parts of that. But the point here is that we don't need to use this error. We're tax-claiming more frequently, or tax-claiming more frequently, and I want to address this. We don't need a more concentrated industry for that. So, again, these points, all of them come at this idea, these policy materials are something that actively, and particularly by industry leaders, that is leading them to sort of pull the claims more and more from, and their dominance in these industries is increased concentration over time. All right? Move away. All right. So, this is there with the slide animation. So, that's the policymaker side. The issue that now, you know, what do academic staff have to say about this? It would be nice if we could have some evidence in support of this. Are there any of the literature that is, first of all, there's no direct evidence, but there's evidence on either side of this as to whether or not tax avoidance could be a factor here. So, on the yes side, tax avoidance could be contributing to this. Over the same time period where the decline of finance papers has documented an increase in concentration, there's been a challenge with documented tax avoidance has also increased. So, that's the Steiner et al. JFE paper of 2017. There are other studies that, well, they don't focus necessarily on industry leaders, so this is a form to add about the highest market shares in particular, but they look at, say, large firms. Do firms in the market have power? Do they have greater avoidance? And some people find that the answer to that question is yes, with various strengths and weaknesses of those designs. And then there's other papers. They don't look at tax avoidance per se, but look at, let's say, tax advantages and find that firms that have tax advantages seem to create what's better for them in the marketplace. So, those are all kind of points that, again, maybe there's something behind what the policy makers are saying. And at the same time, there's other papers that I think tap down on that. So, there's a number of papers that talk and show that tax avoidance strategies can be fairly easily limited by competitors. If you can just copy what your competitor is doing from a tax avoidance perspective, then it's not really a source of a sustained competitive advantage and one that's unlikely to materially lead to industry concentration. There's also some papers that show that the cash related to tax avoidance might be uncertain and that firms may own more of that cash within the firm, and then if I'm owning it within the firm, now I can't use it to gain a competitive advantage. And then, finally, there's some self-promotion here. I've got a recent paper with Ed, later with one of our students, William Nutter, that says, hey, is that the literature that found that some larger firms were tax-advantaged? That may be a little bit overstated, what those prior papers were finding. So, again, it's at least to us, I think, we feel unclear whether the policy makers, what they're saying is going to be backed up, at least empirically. Thank you. I think there's more questions from David. Yeah. Yeah, hi again, John. So, first I wanted to say I like how you guys, how you ran with the papers. Since I saw last time and yesterday, we actually had a reading group with our great PhD students and I think we had a really good discussion on that. And I think we all agree that the question that you have is super interesting and I think you do a great job also in the paper, but also it's nice to say that it's definitely policy relevant and, as I mentioned, policy makers care about. One thought I had, though, and this might be just because, as you said, this is a completely new draft and you just rewrote the complete paper. I felt now it has a really, really strong policy flavor, right? And you seem to, because this is such a big question, it seems to imply, okay, when you start reading it, okay, we answer the question whether tax avoidance leads to more industry concentration, right? And then I was thinking if this kind of framing, I see why you might be doing it because it shows it's important, but might do a certain way of disservice because then I feel like later, when the setting I have, right, so you focus on European industry data, right? And it's also, I think it's probably the indication of a relatively short time frame and then you get COVID, right? So I felt like, then I was like, oh, I'm not, I think you can see through the question, right? But, and this is good because there was a new piece of ideas, but I maybe was thinking that you could mention the policy implications, but maybe tone it down a little bit. Maybe say rather, okay, you speak to whether the batteries, right, that you focus on in priority for the day in a European setting help shape industry concentration, right? And I think you can still keep this policy motivation, which is great, but otherwise you might say the issues that readers, or most importantly, maybe reviewers are like, oh, you tell me all, you have all these big policy questions, but then you cannot really answer them, right? And I think you don't actually have to. So this might be more of a writing and framing thing, just something maybe to consider when you continue revising the paper. Yeah, no, thank you for that. I mean, I agree with what you're saying. So, you know, kind of what we've talked about so far is like a high-level motivation, right? So you've got, you know, you've got a motivating question, and then you drill down to something that you can actually test, and that's kind of the answer to your question. So you're right, like our motivation is sky-high here. Like we're, you know, these policy makers are out there saying, talking to them, talking about the fact that we're going to take a vote today when it comes to the industry consultation. But what we're actually going to be able to do is going to be a little bit more limited in terms of what we can actually say, you know, it's going to be in this setting, we'll take regulation. Now, you know, we're going to try to go beyond that a little bit, but of course we're open to other ideas, too, and how we can broaden the scope. Yeah, at the end of the day, the way I view our paper is we're providing the four Cs of evidence that's directly trying to examine the connection between the corporate tax avoidance, in particular with the policy makers, I guess that's a weird animation, but, you know, with the policy makers saying the crackdown on tax avoidance, that's going to facilitate less industry concentration, right? You know, there's no direct evidence of that, so that's where I think we come in and we're going to provide one piece of evidence, but there's no need to shoot it in here, right? I think we should, you know, we can try to set this in, for example, the U.S. like that would be great and with different regulations and different kinds of factors. I think more can be done here. I think, yeah, so I'm just trying to say that we don't view our paper like the only paper that should be in the paper. It's a really important area and we're going to try to tackle it in one way that we think has the strengths and weaknesses, but other people, you know, to find other strategies that can also speak to this. So, I think your point is well taken, though. Yeah, yeah. Any questions from staff? Hi, John. I like how you're using this policy. My question is, because you've taken the funnel direction, I'm not sure they're more able to avoid that rather than the other way around. And another is, do you think they really can use this way or they just use it as an attempt to target the large firm? You know, Microsoft, with your evidence, do you think you can change their mind? That's a great question. The problem with this paper and the paper with Ed and Will, so the paper with Ed and Will, you can tell that they're getting a competition tax. So, you can say, hey, are the super star firms, do they enjoy lower tax returns? Because, again, you can find policymaker quotes, politicians out there that claim this, right? Now, at the end of the day, I can't get in their head and figure out whether what they're saying, they actually believe it, they're like true believers, or are they saying it because they have this end that they're trying to justify, right? That maybe they won't watch this paper because they think that's going to be politically popular, right? Because, you know, there's lots of populism in politics around the world these days. So, maybe it's just being driven by that. So, you're right. I can't, I don't know for sure which one it is. And I don't think they necessarily usually will do it, right? If you tell yourself enough times that the big firms are bad, maybe you start to believe it. But, you know, all we're doing is we're trying to take on the same value. We're saying, hey, they seem to be saying this. Maybe some of them believe it. Let's go out and see if we can try to provide some empirical evidence on it. You know, I agree that, you know, maybe there's like a reverse causality story there. Although, we're going to try to explore actually the tax avoidance differences between the large firms and other firms, too, here. Because that also is under research in terms of focusing actually on the industry leaders. But, I mean, again, I agree that it's not clear whether they believe what they're saying or not. But we're just trying to take on the same value. Yes. Okay, thank you. Yes. Cool. Cool. So, again, what we want to do is try to provide some empirical evidence, some of the initial empirical evidence in this topic. The challenges with doing so are twofold. One, again, ideally you'd like to measure tax avoidance and measure industry concentration. And it turns out it's very hard to measure both of these things well, as it is. On the tax avoidance side, there's been a plenty of debate over time, like, hey, we get these different tax avoidance measures, and they really capture tax avoidance, which one captures it better. There's drawbacks to, like, the effective tax rate measure that probably most people are aware of. You get measured for both firms very easily. So that's a problem. And then, you know, I'm thinking, like, tax avoidance is endogenous to lots of different other firms' choices and behaviors, right? So then, you know, ideally when you've got the story of, hey, it's concentration-affected by tax avoidance, you'd like to have some endogenous variation in tax avoidance. So that, practically speaking, can be challenging. The other big empirical issue is measuring industry concentration. And it's well-known in these literatures that if you're trying to measure industry concentration with, like, the top of the news data set, like ConsuSat, you're not going to do a great job. Because those data sets aren't going to be measured with private funds, right? So there's been some studies that have actually compared, have some private fund-administrated data and CompuSat data and compared, like, negative industry concentration across to what they find with them. CompuSat measures aren't very good, basically. So those are the two challenges we're grappling with. And so what we're going to do in the paper is try to ask a slightly more specific research question and test that research question in a setting that's going to allow us to get around, we hope, some of the issues with the measurement of these two concepts. So our specific research question is going to be, do anti-tax avoidance regulations reduce industry concentration? And as David mentioned already, we're going to be testing this in a specific setting. We're going to be looking at 17 EU countries, and we're going to be looking at the anti-tax avoidance regulations that were brought about by the SAPS project, which is a data generation and profit shifting project, which began in 2013. So there's this project that was initiated by the OECD. I'll talk a little bit more about it later. But the EU initially said, hey, each country, you need to start adopting some of these regulations. And what we're going to do is we're going to exploit the variation across these countries and the extent to which these regulations led to an increase in anti-tax avoidance regulations prior to what they had before. So some countries already had lots of regulations, some didn't. And so we're going to give this shock and say there's going to be variations in the extent to which these countries are exposed to an increase in these anti-tax avoidance regulations. And I'll talk more about them here shortly. So, again, when I think about these fearful advantages, and I know that there's going to be some drawbacks and issues that we're going to try to address later as well, the anti-tax avoidance regulations, they help us get around this issue of measuring tax avoidance, like what does that measure? Is it dodgy? Because we're going to hope that we get some exogenous variation out of the signing and cross-functional variation of these regulations. And the second thing we're going to be able to do in Europe is we've got our hands on some administrative data. And so what that allows us to do is get a much more accurate picture of agency concentration across these countries because it's going to include public and private firms. Right? So that's going to be an improvement over what people may be able to do, for example, in the U.S. in this context. Yeah. Hi. Hi again. Hi again. I'm not sure how fast this number can change across time. I'm not sure that there's a – Yeah, I'm sorry. I'm not sure whether there is – yeah, whether there are any, for example, some intermediate measures may slip into the high evaluation time in the short term. Yeah. Whether you can use more sensitive, like abnormal probability, that type of thing to capture, yeah, the relative short term effects. The United States may not change that fast. Yeah. I agree with that. I agree with that. So the answer is currently to your question. So one, I agree with that. And then the current answer to your question is no. We're only going to look at the agency level measures. So one thing that we'll do that I'll show you a little later on in the paper is we'll examine how this thing – we'll show you the main results, which is the slide you've seen before and after, but then also show you the treatment dynamics, the timing effects, and we can see whether or not – if there's any evidence of, like, a gradual reduction over time. And the answer is going to be kind of no, even if there's a delay of, let's say, three, four, five years. That's not obvious to people overseas. And sometimes people say intermediate measures. I'm not opposed to that. But, I mean, some keepers have tried to link tax avoidance or tax avoidance regulations in, like, sales, and they find things, right? But the question that always is, is the impact that that's having on sales for a certain firm, is that going to be material enough to actually change industry competitive dynamics? And that's the place where I struggle with the other keepers. How do I make that lead to something that the regulators have been here about? And so that's what we do on keepers, try to go there and test the results. So, but I'm not opposed to doing that. And then another idea that popped into my head when you were talking is maybe it's the case – and I don't know if that guy was here to talk about this, but maybe it's the case that some industries, because of the nature of the competition in the industry, might adjust quicker than others. I don't know. Maybe industries with quicker innovation cycles or production cycles. I can't say. But if we can make some sort of ethics and predictions about, this is an industry where I think the HHI might move quicker than in another industry, where maybe there's this, like, massive barriers to entry, you know, lots of things like that. But then maybe we can kind of see whether these things are having an impact in those quicker industries. And I don't know if that makes sense or if you think that's a good idea, but that's just something that popped into my head. Yeah, I think, like, for the, I don't know, the industry entry reasons, rather than some entry model, I don't actually think that that would help. I think you're too far away from your paper, but, like, because your argument is actually more poignant than how to speak for a firm to, for some firm to gain some competitive advantage by investing in innovation. So I'm not sure whether it's connected to all the checks, whether they're investment or even market, like, how many activities, those types of things change. But that may be too remote from your paper. The big data is the negative and how they gain the advantage. After a while, you will find how they gain the advantage, whether these actions will be shaped by this regulation. It's like the middle, the middle step, you know, maybe even an amelioration for something there. Which is a great point. I mean, like, when you write, when you write a paper that has results, right, we have found a result on a concentration, and then the next thing we do that is a mechanism test. Like, why is this happening, right? But then we didn't find a result. So it's a little bit hard to think about what the mechanism test should be in that sense. And, again, what we end up trying to do is we try to think about why. Why is there no result, right? And we're going to grapple with lots of different reasons. We think we've come to one. But I'm not opposed to looking at some of these other outcome variables, like faster-moving outcomes, or, like I said, you know, trying to focus on settings where maybe the concerns are greater. And we do have one of those currently in the paper, one of the industry-level tests. But I think there's more we can do there and build out the paper along that, along that dimension a little more. Any other questions? Oh, go ahead. And, by the way, I've got two people taking notes of me, I think. So Christian and, is it Wayne again? Yes. So thank you. Yeah, so it's not that I'm ignoring your comments, but we've got multiple people working on this. Yes, hi. Hi, John. So I just have a question because you are looking at EU countries, and you mentioned earlier about the sales paper, and they focused largely on the U.S. I'm just wondering whether it's a setting that could also be, you know, resulting in different results because, I mean, the EU, they are known to be, you know, focused on, you know, in their two-tenths of a trillion of market competition compared to the U.S. So do you think it could be that, you know, it's just a setting that is causing different results? It absolutely could be. So, again, and this goes back, I think, to what Dave was talking about earlier, is, you know, when we actually, you know, I think having this motivating topic is fine, but then when we actually talk about, you know, the policy application, one thing that didn't really make it into the revised version, the new version, the caveat is basically saying, hey, for example, you know, what we're doing, we're tackling it in Europe because there's several advantages, I think, of this setting, but this may not be the highest-powered setting to look at this, right? So while we're saying it doesn't exist here with these regulations, but there's advantages to doing that, it doesn't preclude the fact that it could exist somewhere else, right? Right. And so one thing we did in the prior version is we did have some descriptive, kind of correlational-type measures in the U.S. setting, and it was kind of the same story. And so maybe we can bring some of those back, but I want to do it in a way that still makes the story of the show the anti-calculator because we think the empirical advantages are strong in terms of getting the identification off of that. But if, for example, later I'll show you some kind of descriptive evidence about the tax avoidance of leaders and their close competitors, so industry leaders and their close competitors, and those results are actually not that different in the U.S. So we can bring some of those things back. We took all of that out in this version, but we can bring some of that stuff back in for sure. But your point was, again, in terms of the shock itself, we can only speak to this setting here. I think the sales paper, they do have a few shots that you could, but it's not about anti-tax avoidance. It's more about a positive shock to tax avoidance. Yeah. Can you talk about the Barnett office? Yeah, the Luckin et al. paper, yeah. Yeah. So they have some ways where they're trying to get exogenous variation in tax avoidance, and I'm trying to think how to put this. We can have a debate over whether how successful that is, is what I'm going to say, right? And so just like we can have a debate about how, you know, maybe this was giving up that setting, you know, or there may be reasons why you wouldn't expect it in this setting. But we can think about it. We do have to be careful not to, like, try to copy what they do. But, yeah, I don't know. Try to be diplomatic here in one setting. I don't know if that's coming across, but. Okay. All right. All right, yeah. So good comments. Again, appreciate the feedback. All right, cool. So we've kind of already, like, you know, spoiled the punchline here, which is, like, we're not going to find, actually, that the anti-tax avoidance regulations are going to have a meaningful effect on concentration. And it's not going to be for lack of trying our part. We're going to throw a lot of different things at this in terms of specifications. We're going to look at different types of regulations, because our main event is going to pull them all together. We're going to break it apart. There's going to be individual ones, but maybe one of them has an impact. We're going to look at certain specific industries, that the policy makers seem to care about. So that's, like, I'm close to, I think, Leonard, your idea of just, you know, let's look at settings where maybe this can happen faster. Right? I think we can do more there. And then we're going to do a lot of stuff to show that, again, we think that our new results are going to be, it's a lack of effect, not a lack of power. But we'll just sit down and we'll see how persuasive you guys think those steps are. And then this is kind of like a mechanism step here. We're going to go and look at industry leaders and compare them to the closest competitors. And what we're going to find here, I think, is quite revealing, which is that actually the industry leaders don't seem to, at least in this setting, different tax avoidance levels than the competitors. Furthermore, they're not differently impacted by these anti-tax avoidance regulations. So if you think about the policy makers, kind of where they're coming from, they're kind of assuming that the industry leaders, that they're avoiding a lot more. Our results do not support that. Right? And, again, we found this also in the U.S. setting and found something similar there. Furthermore, again, maybe why the anti-tax avoidance regulations are working to reduce prostrate resistance, they affect both the leaders and their closest competitors. So if you're really trying to have a tax negative in here that reduces the industry leaders and their competitors, you've got to have something to target for, specifically. And, again, the anti-tax avoidance regulations aren't specific enough to do that. So maybe that's why we're not finding it in this setting. But, anyway, that's what we're finding. So, again, the overall takeaway is that the tax avoidance, at least in our setting, with our design, doesn't seem to be a material driver of industry concentration. Again, there's lots of reasons for this. Maybe the regulations are poorly designed. Maybe they need to target the market leaders. Maybe, you know, if we did this in the U.S. setting, we'd find it. Or, maybe, tax avoidance just isn't a material contributor to industry concentration, on average. That's also a possibility, I would say, to keep in mind. Hey, David. Hey, John. Just a quick follow-up on your previous slide and this discussion on the setting you're focusing on. Because, so, I feel your setting has the advantage, as you say, well, you look at these international profit shifting with the batch rules, right, and then you look at industry composition at the country level, at the national level, right? And then, when I was thinking, and so, also, I think it has pros and cons. I think the pros, you can say, well, I think the argument that policymakers have, which I think about, well, you have a giant like Amazon, right? They can use all these international profit shifting tools and then, through maybe various channels, invest in innovation, right? They have more money and they can keep, say, small companies and the industries coming up, right? And, but then I was thinking, well, on the other hand, if you think about these European countries, right, like smaller countries, so they might be thinking, well, they have these batch rules, right? But then, maybe, they also have, on top of that, some national tax rules that either further limit the, you know, like, say, deductibility for these big companies, right? I think, for example, Belgium has some of these laws. I think Austria also has some of these laws. So, countries actually, you need to actually say, well, we don't care, you know, we have these international instruments, but on top of that, we will, you know, if you're Amazon and you have, I don't know, interest payments, repayments, we just won't recognize them, right? You cannot deduct them, right? And then, on top of that, these countries, for example, I know Belgium, they have these rules, where they'll actually say, well, we want to, similar to what Stefan said, we actually want to, for smaller national Belgian companies, right, we actually make, if you will, tax avoidance, it's easier for them, for example, they have an IPVX regime, right? The Navy ban is, so we have a paper on that, which kind of says, okay, you actually can avoid taxes as long as you do it by innovating in Belgium, right? So, taking all these things together, I was thinking if, on top of these vast rules that you're investigating, right, if you could further look at maybe some more national rules, right, in both directions, so in the direction of, kind of, strengthening market power of these M&Es, of these international companies, but also on, kind of, taxable, strengthening the position of maybe smaller new market entrants, right, national companies, local companies, and, maybe have that as an additional tax, right, on top of that, so then you could say, not necessarily anti-tax avoidance rules, but generally, like, tax policy shaping, industry composition, something like that, right, and maybe you only have two countries in Europe, right, where you have these regulations, maybe this could just be some additional evidence, speaking to your results, saying, well, overall, we don't find this, but if we look at very specific settings, there seems to be this effect, and, you know, it can maybe speak a bit to what we talked about before, something like a mechanism, or, you know, like, understanding what's going on here. I like this idea, yeah, so, just to be clear, I'm happy to find the results, because, ultimately, it's a lot easier to publish the paper, if we can find the results, so, so, I'm totally in favor of, of looking at, we're going to have, we're going to be focused on, mainly, this BEPS stuff, but we're going to, we already have one additional setting, where we'll tackle some transfer pricing regulations, prior to that, as far as this, but, I would be totally fine going and looking at specific countries, and what they do, and maybe, maybe we find something there, and then there's nuance, right, it's like, hey, if you want to use BEPS, it's like, hey, if you want to use tax policy, as a mechanism, to impact competition, or concentration, this is the way that you've got to do it, not this way, right, so, that would be, taking the essential conclusions, that basically, if we found, if we found the results, in those, in those more narrow settings, right, maybe, like you said, giving the advantages, to the, to taking tax avoidance, easier for the, for the smaller firms, right, maybe that's, that's how you do it, and then, after the presentation, we'll link up with you, and get the specifics, of these, of these particular, national regulations, and we can show you, how to get them up. Sure, for sure. Yeah, yeah, sure, and, and one, one follow-up question I had, on, on, on Leon's point, about the, the market entries, is this something, you had, you can do with your data, and that, could you, could you see, how many, like say, you see a number of firms, you can see, if there are more firms, or if there's complete data, or if the industry is growing, so to speak, I mean, just something, if you don't know, I'll get to what we had, but maybe just as a count, because I was, again, I was thinking maybe, just two anecdotes, in this example I gave, right, like a few of, I wouldn't expect, you know, suddenly you have Feds, and then, I don't know, Amazon in Austria, is getting much weaker for that, right, like in terms of the industry power, but maybe, again, in conjunction with, maybe some national policies, that help smaller firms, maybe at the same time, you see, more firms coming into this, or something, yeah, more interest, because I feel like, this would be, also, Leon mentioned, in terms of the timeline, right, I see you have the timeline restriction, right, we cannot extend the sample much, by the sample period, but maybe you can say, well, maybe instead of, seeing in this HHI, in like, some changes, we see that more firms are in there, right, so that could speak to, see if you have, a more competitive industry, or something like that, yeah, I think, yeah, I like that idea, so I don't, yeah, I don't know, off the top of my head, whether we have that data, but we could absolutely, look into it, and I think it would, if we could do it, it would actually, complement the staff, right, and again, maybe the answer is more, go on, maybe you could, in terms of aging time, we're asking the example, maybe you see these earlier signs, of the industry being more competitive, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah,